Political Realism Essay Example for Free

Political naive realism EssayAccording to realists, the conduct of external leaders differs very little from the conduct of a leader of a criminal organization. Realists underlying assumption, i. e. that the transnational system is in the condition of perpetual anarchy, is close to how annoyance bosses perceive the neverending competition amid divergent gangs, clans or crime families, like the one Tony Soprano heads. Just like in relations between competing crews or between criminals and the g everywherenment, no progress to struggleds lasting peace is possible in international relations. planetary relations be by definition conflictual, unlike domestic matters of a state, since there is no exacting authority over sovereign subject which would possess monopoly on force similar to the one a state has on its territory. Conflicts in international relations, according to realists, argon always resolved by the spend of force. Here the analogy of Tony Soprano is particularl y relevant, since he has killed at least eight people. Similarly, power in international relations, according to realists, is associated with army superiority and ability to defeat enemies.Crime families pursue their own interests exploitation resources they command, but they are well aware of resources and capabilities of their competitors. The same way states in international relations fixate calculations of their power and interests vs. power and interests of their rivals. Therefore, intelligence information (everything that can be uptaked against competitors) is equally valuable in international relations and criminal activity. Peace and stability is lonesome(prenominal) possible when a durable counterweight of power exists that reflects actual standing of owing(p) powers on the international arena.The same happens in the criminal world. Although gangs and crime families study no moral obligations towards each other, they can sometimes cooperate against a common opposi tion (states on their part form international alliances). Balance of power among criminal organizations is of a paramount greatness for peace and quiet in a city or neighborhood. As Sullivan (2000) informs, criminal groups sustain spatial or economic spheres of influence turf or markets (p. 86). The states act the same way when they perceive veritable regions of the world as their spheres of influence.For the U. S. , the Middle East is a region of strategic importance, as its enduring military presence there clearly indicates. Similarly, Russia is treating the former Soviet republics as a priorityin an stew both to obtain lucrative assets and to enhance its political influence (Trenin 2006, p. 91). Realists also believe that there is a difference between private and political morality for the public and private spheres, there should be diametric codes of ethical conduct, and some actions inacceptable in private morality terms can be indispensable in politics.This argument can b e perhaps extended further to state that different ethical codes are applied to domestic matters and international relations some actions that would be deemed inacceptable by domestic publics are carried start in or against foreign states, sometimes with the approval of the population at home. Here, an interesting example is the conflict of Henry Kissinger in the uprooting of Allendes popular regime in Chile.While it would be a arguable to assume Kissinger believed that democracy served the interests of American people (since he hasnt made attempts to subvert the public order), he has been reported to comment on the Chilean election of socialist Alllende in the following way The issues are much too important for the Chilean voters to be left to decide for themselves (cited in Zarembka 2006, p. ix). He has in fact denied that Chileans had a correctly to elect their own leaders, while Americans could teach other countries about right and wrong.In everyday life, this would be referr ed to as hypocrisy however, according to political realists, this is how politics is made on the daily basis. In a similar fashion, many crime bosses are good at maintaining cardinal distinct sets of values, one to be applied to intra-organizational matters and another one for the rest of the world. Inside their crime family, gangsters butt much(prenominal) qualities as loyalty, honesty, and nobility. All criminal organizations father a code of conduct that is strictly enforced, although such codes have little to do with morality and ethics in the conventional sense.That is why to the outside world, they reckon as cruel, self-interested beasts. Similarly, political leaders have to maintain two sets of values in their private affairs, they have to be an example of integrity and righteousness, as the scandal with Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky shows. Also, they have to be good to their electorates and permute surface political rivals. However, in international relations, they are expected to defend vital interests of their democracy with monishmination and firmness. The avenue to War This section will look into strange and unusual circumstances and events that lead to wars.The extent to which types of government and domestic publics have an impact on war proneness of states will be discussed. At a first glance, the recent U. S. attack of Iraq is an example of a war between a democracy and monarchal country, so it is not particularly applicable for testing the classless peace theory. In fact, the official fountain for going to Iraq, as Scowcroft (2002) reports, was regime change Saddam Hussein oppressed his own people and present a bane to international security. It was exactly the undemocratic nature of Iraq that made it a tangible threat to the U.S. it was deemed that its democratization would automatically provide for peace. Saddam was portrayed as a leader that was impossible to deter by diplomatic elbow room, sanctions, or the threat of forc e, therefore the invasion was deemed the only viable option for preventing Iraq from acquiring and deploying WMD (Mearsheimer Walt 2003). However, even before the actual deployment, there were forces in the foreign insurance policy establishment work for a more careful balancing of various U. S. interests at home and abroad. The war on Iraq, as Scowcroft (2002) then argued, would divert U. S.resources from other important pursuits such as the war on terror or resolution of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As the difficulties in Iraq have powerfully brought home, realism for the U. S. straight off does not mean the use of force but rather refraining from it. The Bush doctrine implied going to war and falling out with associate for the sake of furthering American ideals (Rose 2005), on the aforementioned assumption that democratization is a necessary prerequisite for peace. This neocon line is sometimes referred to as democratic transformationalism, which is essentially liberal inte rventionism (Goldberg 2005).In his second term, however, Bush has been increasingly more inclined towards realism and looking out for actual American interests. To that end, he mended relations with europium and returned to negotiating with rogue states (Rose 2005). This is in line with the need to balance ones power and interests against those of other great powers. Such a change in orientation once again suggests that changes in leadership have a significant bearing on the war-proneness of a democratic state, a conclusion Elman (1997) has reached after analyzing the 1982 war between Israel and Lebanon.While no change of leadership has taken place in the U. S. , a change in Presidents orientation and some reshuffle in the foreign policy establishment were responsible for the shift. While people like Henry Kissinger are vilified as amoral hypocrites, moralism in foreign policy has never led to anything good for the U. S. Harry Truman was responsible for the Korean War, John F. Ken nedy and Lyndon Johnson have initiated the Vietnam War, and Bill Clinton has presided over the Balkan conflict and a deterioration of relations with China.However, right- or left-wing moralists have almost always been succeeded by realists and foreign policy pragmatists who helped to clear the mess (Rose 2005). This mirrors the discussion by Postel (2004) of how democracy-spreading ambitions of George W. Bush touch American realists (together with libertarians and traditionalists). Realisms main assumption is the primacy of state sovereignty, therefore an interference into the affairs of another state is only justified if an existential threat exists to ones own country.Before that point is reached, the internal organization of another country is not any of our business (Goldberg 2005, para. 25). A far more important reason to worry about the spread of democratic transformationalism is the human and economic cost of it. As Johnson (2000) clearly shows, the U. S. is an overextended empire try to sustain its military commitments abroad, and the people of the United States are neither militaristic decorous nor rich enough to engage in the perpetual police actions, wars, and bailouts their governments hegemonic policies will require (p.221). This argument suggests that populations at home ultimately have some say over foreign policy or at least over the economic cots of overseas military exercises. This point will be explored in great detail further in this section. The supporters of democratic transformationalism think that the threat posed by Saddam at the turn of the century was the natural consequence of the limited nature of the U. S. intervention during the first Gulf War. then(prenominal) the U. S. , in accordance with the U. N. mandate, focused on removal of Iraq from Kuwait and not the removal of Saddam from Iraq.Neoconservatives called it an unsanded job the focus on stability instead of democratization has lead to the current mess, in their feeli ng (Goldberg 2005). Some commentators believe that the sole reason why the U. S. did not go to Iraq then was the Vietnam syndrome (Ferguson 2004). While historic evidence is mixed wit regard to the democratic peace theory (and therefore the feasibility of democratic transformationalism), it is too early to dismiss it as trivial. This theory might as well be applicable in the 21st century, even if it has failed for most of the 19th and 20th centuries, for two major reasons.First of all, with the orgasm of new technologies, the level of interconnectedness between peoples of the world has increased dramatically. Citizens of democratic states enjoy unrestricted plan of attack to the Internet and the ability to travel to other democratic countries, usually without a visa. Therefore, public opinion in a democratic country is unlikely to support a military action against another democratic country, since there are personal ties between citizens of both, or the consumption of cultural pro ducts from another country (e. g. french cinema or Danish design) has created an emotional attachment to a foreign land. The EU can be held up as a prime example. The European continent has been at war for most of its existence. However, nowadays no one can imagine a war between two EU members. perchance it was not the participation in common decision-making institutions (which are still weak and contested) but the strength of people-to-people contacts (encouraged by student mobility programs, the rise of an international passkey class, cross-border marriages, and even the proposed mobility program for military staff) that has delivered the change.A valid protest to this reasoning would be that professionalization of armies has diminished the level of control publics have over armed forces. As Johnson (2000) explains, for most of the 20th century, national armies were formed by universal conscription, by volunteers, or by a combination of both. It was of paramount importance to su stain patriotic spirit among troops and persuade them by means of propaganda that an enemy poses an existential threat to their nation.If states failed to maintain a firmness of purpose among soldiers, insubordination, desertion and sabotage sack out an army effectively non-battleworthy. However, professional soldiers perceive their mission merely as a special class of employment. Although states still initiate massive campaigns to convince their publics of necessity of a war, like it was in the case of Iraq, professional soldiers would be ready to battle any enemy their state commanded them to.Moreover, a state can get private security providers to wage wars for them. Although there was no case when a war was waged by using such providers only, the involvement of private military companies (PMC) and private security companies (PSC) in Iraq has received a potful of attention (Singer 2004). Thus, a government can still wage a war against another country in opposition to domestic public opinion by relying on a professional armies or private security provides.